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Do local improvements in infrastructure provision improve city competitiveness? What public 
finance mechanisms stimulate local infrastructure supply? And how do local efforts compare 
with national decisions of placing inter-regional trunk infrastructure? In this paper, we examine 
how the combination of local and national infrastructure supply improve city competitiveness, 
measured as the city’s share of national private investment. For the empirical analysis, we 
collect city-level data for India, and link private investment decisions to infrastructure provision. 
We find that a city’s proximity to international ports and highways connecting large domestic 
markets has the largest effect on its attractiveness for private investment. In comparison, the 
supply of local infrastructure services – such as municipal roads, street lighting, water supply, 
and drainage – enhance competitiveness, but their impacts are much smaller. Thus, while local 
efforts are important for competitiveness, they are less likely to be successful in cities distant 
from the country’s main trunk infrastructure. In terms of financing local infrastructure, we find 
that a city’s ability to raise its own source revenues by means of local taxes and user fees 
increases infrastructure supply, whereas as inter governmental transfers do not have statistically 
significant effects. 
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1 Introduction 
Following independence, India’s metropolitan areas faced considerable disadvantages in 
attracting and developing industry. The country’s industrial policy was used to pursue 
national policy goals of promoting spatially balanced development. Strict industrial 
licensing directed investment into lagging areas, and kept heavy industry out of 
metropolitan centres. The state was also actively engaged in large-scale industrial 
production and in development of industrial estates. These policies restricted the 
emergence of industrial clusters in competitive locations, and stifled the 
competitiveness of cities across the urban system. Starting in 1991, when structural 
reforms associated with the liberalization of the economy were put in place, the 
government relaxed regulations for locating industry in metropolitan areas, and reduced 
its own role in industrial production (Bajpai and Sachs 1999; Ahluwalia 2002). 
As a consequence, new investments by the private sector now seek the most profitable 
locations. These include cities that offer good access to intermediate inputs and to 
domestic and international markets, provide reliable and high quality public services, 
and have a business environment conducive to entrepreneurship. Part of a city’s 
attractiveness stems from natural geography and endowments beyond their control. 
Furthermore, in countries such as India, local decisionmakers can only indirectly 
influence national investment decisions that determine placement of interregional 
infrastructure such as major highways and transport hubs. That leaves local public 
goods and services which are within the direct control of city-level decisionmakers. 
These services will be important considerations for private investment decisions and 
their quality will largely depend on a city’s ability to sustainably raise and allocate local 
revenues. 
In this paper, we examine the relative contribution of local as opposed to national 
infrastructure endowments in determining the competitiveness of Indian cities since 
economic liberalization, with competitiveness being measured as an individual city’s 
share of national private industrial investment. These investment decisions are 
determined by profits that entrepreneurs can expect to achieve by investing in specific 
cities. Profits are likely to depend on prices for physical inputs and local wage rates, as 
well as the quality of the city’s infrastructure. For the empirical analysis, we undertake 
direct examination of infrastructure’s contribution to the competitiveness of Indian 
cities. We extend the framework developed in Röller and Waverman (2001) for the 
telecommunications sector, and develop a model of infrastructure and industrial 
investment decisions at the city level, where local infrastructure is endogenously 
determined.  
We also address the important issue of endogeneity in the assessment of interregional 
transport infrastructure. National infrastructure investment decisions are not made 
randomly but, rather, are made to connect cities that are already growing more rapidly 
than others, or to favour politically important cities such as state capitals. India’s 
national highway development programme, including its multi-billion dollar golden 
quadrilateral, will not develop new roads. Instead, it will upgrade the quality of roads 
already connecting large and nationally important cities. Thus, interregional transport 
investments are correlated with observable and unobservable city-level characteristics, 
and not correcting for omitted variable bias will provide misleading estimates for 
transport infrastructure.   2
This paper also asks another important policy question: Given that public infrastructure 
investment has significant impacts on firm investment decisions and, therefore, local 
development, how can local governments increase investments in public infrastructure 
under their jurisdiction? Specifically, which is the more effective scheme to finance 
public infrastructure investment: more transfers from national or state governments, or 
own revenue generation through municipal taxes? We examine the relative effectiveness 
of these two public financing schemes. 
Our empirical application of this model draws on a unique dataset on industrial 
investment and city public finance for Indian cities in the 1990s. The data allow us to 
estimate spatially detailed models of city-level demand, supply, and investment impacts 
regarding improving infrastructure and public services. By building a city’s investment 
profile over time, it becomes possible to assess how investment decisions respond to 
changes in local actions in terms of providing the public goods valued by firms. 
Our main findings are that proximity to interregional infrastructure, measured by 
domestic market access and travel times to seaports, has large and significant effects on 
improving a city’s attractiveness for private investment. Our indicator of market access 
is based on the New Economic Geography literature, and improves on commonly used 
indicators such as road length or road density as they are fraught with measurement 
error and do not account for network connectivity. We also find that the supply of local 
infrastructure services has a positive and significant effect on city-level investment 
attractiveness. Our measures of local infrastructure include municipal roads, street 
lighting, water supply and drainage. These effects are robust across econometric 
specifications and estimation procedures. However, the effects of domestic market 
access and proximity to ports are considerably larger than the effects of local 
infrastructure supply, indicating that a large part of city success is influenced by 
national programme placement decisions. Local efforts are important – but are not the 
main drivers of a city’s economic success.  
Further, a city’s own efforts in revenue generation have significant effects on the supply 
of local infrastructure, while the supply effects through inter-governmental transfers are 
ambiguous. These results suggest that, while local decisionmakers have limited scope in 
overcoming disadvantages due to geography and national targeting of interregional 
transport investments, good fiscal policies can improve the delivery of local 
infrastructure services such as water supply and sanitation. These services translate into 
better quality of life for residents, but may change a city’s economic fortunes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the 
modelling framework and discuss how the integrated model of supply, demand, and 
growth extends existing analytic work in this field. This is followed by a brief 
description of the data, and we then report our main findings and offer our conclusions. 
2  A model of infrastructure supply, demand, and competitiveness 
Research on links between infrastructure and economic performance dates back to 
Hirschman’s (1958) theories of unbalanced growth, and to contributions regarding the 
role of ‘economic and social overhead capital’ in national and regional development 
(Nurkse 1953; Nadiri 1970). Much of the empirical work over the past 20 years is based   3
on econometric studies, where infrastructure enters as an input in aggregate production 
or cost functions. The basic premise behind these studies is that infrastructure is an 
intermediate public good that plays an active part in the production process. Thus, 
increasing the stock of infrastructure – as with increasing any other stock of capital – 
will improve the productivity of existing firms and attract new firms into the region. 
Some of the most cited aggregate production function studies include Aschauer (1989) 
and Munnell (1990). Both papers estimate national time series regressions for the USA, 
and find output elasticities of infrastructure ranging from 0.3–0.4. This work gave rise 
to a number of infrastructure and growth studies in the 1990s that utilized various 
versions of cost and production functions to evaluate the contribution of public 
infrastructure at various spatial scales (nation, states, city) on output, incomes, and 
private capital formation (Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz 1995; Moomaw et al. 1995; 
Garcia-Mila and McGuire 1996). 
Most of these studies estimate single equation models that face two types of 
econometric problem: 
•  Simultaneity bias, where it is difficult to identify whether infrastructure 
stimulates economic performance, or whether infrastructure is provided as a 
response to demand in high growth regions; and 
•  Unobservable sources of heterogeneity, which make some regions more 
attractive (for investment) and influence local infrastructure supply or national 
infrastructure placement decisions.  
Ignoring these issues makes identification questionable, and might exaggerate the 
contribution of public infrastructure to private investment or economic growth more 
generally. 
In our application to Indian urban development, we address these problems by 
developing a structural model that examines how national infrastructure and local public 
services influence city performance. We build on several key contributions to the 
literature on infrastructure and economic growth (Rauch 1995; Morrison and Schwartz 
1996; Fernald 1999; Röller and Waverman 2001), and also draw upon the role of 
market access in the new economic geography literature (Krugman 1991; Venables 
1996; Head and Mayer 2004). One of the key papers in this literature is Röller and 
Waverman (2001). In their model of the telecommunication industry’s contribution to 
economic growth, investments in the sector are endogenized through a model of supply 
and demand, which is jointly estimated with an aggregate production function. Our 
model extends this work in several dimensions.  
First, we distinguish national infrastructure investment and placement decisions from 
city-level infrastructure supply decisions. By instrumenting national infrastructure 
placement and endogenizing local infrastructure service provision, we can assess what 
part of city success can be influenced by local efforts relative to national planning 
decisions and fixed natural endowments. Second, we add the public finance of local 
infrastructure service provision and endogenize this financing mechanism. This allows 
us to examine the relative effectiveness of various public financing schemes in 
increasing local infrastructure supply capacity.  
Finally, we empirically address the reverse causality or simultaneity bias issue by 
providing time lags between manufacturing investment and the explanatory variables in   4
a structural model. We chose a relatively long time lag of three years, such that local 
factors in year t influence firm investments in (t+3). In this way, we control for possible 
reverse causality coming from firm investment to local infrastructure response. We also 
test the robustness of empirical results by comparing various estimation methods (OLS, 
single equation GMM, and 3SLS), and introduce fixed effects that reflect state-level 
unobserved characteristics that could influence city performance as well as 
infrastructure provision. 
2.1  Model of infrastructure and city competitiveness 
We begin by assuming that investment, I, in the ith city responds to expected profits: 
(, , ,, , , ) ii i i i i i i I f MA INF LIN BS X ξ η =    (1) 
In the specification in Equation (1), MAi represents agglomeration economies by means 
of regional market access attributes, which link city producers to intermediate inputs 
and domestic markets. INFi captures the effects of national transport infrastructure 
linking cities to ports and trans-shipment hubs. These two factors depend on the 
endowment of interregional transport infrastructure, which, in the Indian context, is 
largely determined by national and state-level investment decisions. LINi represents 
local public infrastructure offered by the ith city. BSi are complementary business 
services provided by the private sector in city i. Other observable city attractors, such as 
local wage rates, are included in Xi. 
Next,  ξi measures unobserved characteristics of the city  that can affect returns to 
investment. These factors are considered by the investor when choosing a city to invest 
in, but are not captured in the data. These unobserved characteristics can complicate the 
identification of infrastructure’s contribution if they influence the way in which 
(national) infrastructure is allocated across cities. As it is impossible to obtain data on 
all the factors relevant to infrastructure allocation decisions, it is essential to find 
instruments for infrastructure placement that are not correlated with the unobservable 
sources of city attraction or preference.  Finally,  ηi is an idiosyncratic unobserved 
component of profitability in city i. 
In our model, we endogenize local infrastructure provision through the interaction of 
(per capita) infrastructure supply ( )
S g  and demand ( )
D g  equations:  
01 2 ln ln ln
D ga a P ay =− + + Ω  (2) 
Ω + + + + + = ) ln( ) ( ) ln( ln ln 4 3 2 1 0 transfer b tax b st co b P b b g
S  (3) 
S D g g ⋅ =θ  
where 0 , ≥ i i b a . Following Röller and Waverman (2001), we consider ‘effective’ 
demand rather than ‘observed’ demand for infrastructure services. The effective demand 
takes into account the un-met demand, which cannot be observed due to supply 
constraints. More formally, the un-met demand can be defined by the gap between 
normative infrastructure usage requirement and the actual infrastructure service   5





= θ  measures the size of un-met demand relative to the 
observed level of infrastructure service provision. 
The price of infrastructure, P, can be defined by how much consumers pay for 
consuming one unit of infrastructure service (in the form of user charges and tariffs). 
Per capita infrastructure demand ( )
D g  then depends on price (P)  and income (y) 
elasticities. User charges or tariffs are revenue sources to the service providers, so the 
supply of infrastructure ( )
S g  also responds to the price of infrastructure, the average 
cost of infrastructure service provision (cost), and the revenue income of local 
governments in the form of municipal tax receipts (tax) and transfers from higher levels 
of government (transfer). Very few public utilities in Indian cities will cover the full 
cost of service provision through direct user charges. The parameters b3 and b4 thus 
measure the effectiveness of different financing schemes. Infrastructure supply costs 
will also be determined by various local physical attributes, such as technological, 
topographical, or geographical factors. For instance, if there are insufficient reliable 
water sources close to a city, transporting water from far away will increase the cost of 
provision. Finally, various observed and unobserved local characteristics (Ω) influence 
the supply and demand of local infrastructure. 
The two general revenue sources – local taxes, and transfers from higher levels of 
government – might themselves be endogenously determined by local, state, and 
national governments. Adding two structural equations that endogenize financing 
mechanisms, even though in a crude form, could correct potential simultaneity bias and 
provide an insight into local revenue dynamics. We therefore model these two financing 
mechanisms in a simple way, such that: 
Ω + + = y c c tax o ln ) ln( 1  (4) 
Ω + + = y d d transfer o ln ) ln( 1  (5) 
Tax revenues and transfers to local governments are assumed to be influenced by per 
capita local income levels (y) and various local characteristics (Ω). 
We construct systems of regression equations by combining the structural equations of 
Equations 1 to 5, and estimate the models individually and jointly. 
3 Data 
3.1 Private  investments 
For the empirical analysis, we have compiled city-level data from various sources and 
created indicators for various types of local and regional infrastructure. The city-level 
data on private sector manufacturing investment come from the CapEx database, 
maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). By law, any private 
investment of more than 100,000 rupees must be registered with the Reserve Bank of 
India. CMIE keeps records of new and ongoing investment activities that are usually   6
related to setting up new plants and machinery throughout the country. Investment 
projects are tracked from the time they are announced until their commissioning. While 
CMIE has been compiling information at the state level since 1995, we worked with 
CMIE officials to produce district- and city-level summaries of manufacturing 
investment by the private and public sectors. Such datasets for other countries often 
attribute specific investments to a company headquarters rather than to the branch 
location where the factory is located. Fortunately, the records of Indian private 
manufacturing investment identify investment by actual geographical location. 
We use each city’s share of national manufacturing investment in the empirical analysis. 
For each year, this indicator provides us with a snapshot of a city’s economic 
competitiveness as it helps us examine how a city is doing relative to its peers. Table 1 
shows the top 20 cities with the highest national shares of private manufacturing 
investment between 2000 and 2005. These ‘superstar cities’ (Gyourko et al. 2006) 
received about 60 per cent of all national manufacturing investment during the period. 
 
Table 1: Top 20 cities with highest private manufacturing firm investment, 2000–05 
Ranking State  UA/district 
National share of private 
manufacturing firm investment, % 
1 GUJARAT  Jamnagar  UA  6.267 
2  PUNJAB  Rampura Phul UA  5.194 
3 MAHARASHTRA  Raigarh  4.897 
4 TAMIL  NADU  Chennai  UA  4.693 
5 ANDHRA  PRADESH  Chittoor  4.683 
6 JHARKHAND  Jamshedpur  UA  3.115 
7 ORISSA  Cuttack  UA  3.029 
8 KARNATAKA  Bangalore  UA  2.907 
9 KARNATAKA  Bellary  2.729 
10 UTTAR  PRADESH Sultanpur  2.645 
11 KERALA  Kanhangad  UA  2.617 
12 MADHYA  PRADESH  Sagar  UA  2.547 
13 ASSAM  Dibrugarh  UA  2.351 
14 ORISSA  Byasanagar UA  2.150 
15 MAHARASHTRA  Pune  UA  1.803 
16 ORISSA  Ganjam  1.777 
17 CHHATTISGARH  Korba  1.698 
18 KARNATAKA  Mangalore  UA  1.610 
19 GUJARAT  Bhuj  UA  1.570 
20  UTTAR PRADESH  Modinagar UA  1.465 
Total     59.748 
Source: CMIE, CapEx database.   7
At the top of the list is the Jamnagar urban agglomeration in the state of Gujarat, which 
accounted for 6.3 per cent of national private manufacturing investment. Jamnagar is 
located on the Gulf of Kutch. It has a well functioning seaport and is near one of the 
world’s largest refineries, run by the Reliance group of industries. Other cities listed in 
the top 20 include Raigarh (Maharashtra), which is adjacent to the Mumbai metro 
region; Pune (Maharashtra), which is 250 km from Mumbai; Chennai (formerly 
Madras); and Bangalore. Among the top 20 manufacturing investment cities, there are 
three in both Karnataka and Orissa, while the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Uttar 
Pradesh each have two. 
3.2  Regional infrastructure  
To understand how public infrastructure influences city performance, we developed 
several measures of national transport infrastructure, and city-level public services and 
infrastructure (water supply and drainage, street lights, and municipal roads). Many 
studies on transport infrastructure and growth use state or local-level paved road length 
or road density as the measure of choice. For instance, in a recent paper on India, Hulten 
et al. (2006) use data on paved road length from the Ministry of Transport’s Basic Road 
Statistics publication. The road data are disaggregated into national highways (arterial 
roads for interstate movement), state highways (arterial roads for inter-district 
movement, linking up with national highways and adjacent state highways), and district 
roads (other Public Works Department roads). The authors acknowledge that lack of 
data on road capacity (lanes) might be a problem, but a more general caveat is the 
sometimes arbitrary assignment of roads to categories that are only vaguely defined. For 
example, state governments routinely change the nomenclature of roads, and classify 
state highways as national highways and district highways as state highways. In most 
cases, these re-classifications are not accompanied by improvements in quality. As a 
consequence, figures on road networks maintained by the national government are 
misleading, since changes of classification cannot usually be distinguished from new 
road construction.  
A further problem with road length or density indicators is that, in studies of economic 
performance, it is not the presence of roads or the total length of the local network that 
is important but, rather, whether the roads provide fast and convenient access to places 
of importance. In the present study, therefore, we utilize a geographically explicit 
measure of market access that is based on detailed spatial data of India’s interregional 
transport network following the approach outlined in Lall et al. (2004). Using a 
Geographic Information System (GIS), we compute for each city the shortest route to 
other cities as of 1991, which represents potential input and output markets. Travel time 
is determined by distance and the design speed of each link in a quality differentiated 
road network. The summary indicator for each urban area in our analysis is the standard 
market access (or population potential) measure, which is defined as the sum of the 
population of target cities inversely weighted by the travel time required to reach them. 
No detailed interaction data are available that would allow us to estimate the distance 
decay function that models the decreasing influence of markets with increasing distance. 
We therefore follow standard convention by using a negative exponential function. The 
resulting market access indicator provides a generalized measure of regional 
infrastructure endowment. Additionally, we use a more direct indicator – the travel time 
to seaports on the interregional transport network – as a measure of distance from trans-
shipment hubs.   8
3.3 Local  infrastructure  supply 
These data draw on the Local Finance Data System (LFDS) developed by the National 
Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP). This database has extensive information 
on local infrastructure service provision and fiscal conditions of local governments The 
final sample used in this analysis includes data for 151 Indian cities in 1992/93 and 
1997/98. These cities represent 100 urban agglomerations (UA) (which often consist of 
several individual municipalities) and 51 non-UA cities. In our analysis, we use per 
capita figures on water supply released, drainage length, solid waste collection, surface 
municipal road length, and streetlights. Better local infrastructure will have a direct 
benefit on local production, but also reflects the quality of urban management more 
generally. Rather than using all variables as predictors, we produce a summary measure 
of local infrastructure supply as the first principal component of the log values of the 
five individual indicators.
1  
We calculate per capita normative expenditure level following the guidelines initially 
developed by the Zakaria Committee (Zakaria 1963). This committee developed per 
capita expenditure requirements for adequate public services based on physical norms 
and standards. These norms were stratified for five size categories of towns and covered 
water supply, drainage and sewerage, roads and works, and streetlights and electricity 
distribution. Since the initial norms are somewhat out of date, we instead use re-
constructed and updated estimates by Mathur (2001) at 1998–99 prices. We compute a 
corresponding summary of municipal infrastructure expenditure from the LFDS that 
encompasses the same public services.  
The local infrastructure price in the demand equation (Equation 2), P, can be measured 
by how much local residents pay for the consumption of each local infrastructure 
service in the form of tariffs and user charges. We assume local governments’ (per 
capita) receipts of user charges/tariffs are equal to (per capita) non-tax revenue receipts, 




ln ln ln ln ln
infra purchase
non tax revenue receipts / city population




PP g g g
g
⎛⎞
=⋅ −= − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟
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where CPI is the all India consumer price index (CPI) for urban non-manual employees 
with 1984–85 as the base year.  
The average (per capita) cost of local infrastructure service provision, deflated by the 
CPI, is defined as: 
municipal infrastructure expenditure / city population 
ln ln ln
CPI / 100
S ac g ⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.   (7) 
                                                 
1  This indicator preserves 33 per cent of the variance in the original set of variables. 
(6)   9
In addition to direct user charges, local government expenditures on public services are 
also financed by local taxes or transfers from higher levels of government. We construct 
these variables such that lntax  = ln(municipal tax receipts, per capita, real), and 
lntransfer = ln(total transfers from higher levels of governments, per capita, real), both 
of which are deflated by the CPI.  
Average per capita city income, ln y , is proxied by the first principal component of: 
(i)  ln(per capita net state domestic product at factor cost, at constant price); 
(ii)  ln(municipal total tax revenue receipts, per capita, real); and  
(iii) ln(per capita waste generated).  
Table 2 summarizes the main variables used in the analysis. 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Local infra supply  302  2.079 2.964  0.009  25.700
Avg. distance to ports, hours 244  13.112 12.724  0.010  46.354
Market access  254  12165 11164  216  66976
Wages, per worker, real (Rs)  200  5819 2470  1073  13005
Net value-added, per employee, real (Rs) 209  64281 122640  3477  1264801
Business service jobs, per capita  284  0.155 0.399  0.000  3.656
Local infra demand  302  8.603 15.562  0.056  185.247
Local infra price  302  0.042 0.105  0.000  0.883
Local avg. income  296  2.658 3.649  0.025  29.762
Avg. cost of local infra supply 302  0.076 0.203  0.001  2.361
Local tax revenue, per capita (1000 Rs)  302  0.062 0.088  0.000  0.656
Transfers, per capita (1000 Rs)  300  0.046 0.038  0.002  0.382
4 Main  findings 
In this section, we report results from specifications estimating the contribution of 
infrastructure to city-level competitiveness. We discuss results from the model 
estimated with three-stage least squares estimators (3SLS). We also estimated 
specifications with ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimators – these are available on request. 
In Table 3, we combine the firm investment model with a model of the local 
infrastructure model of supply, demand, and financing. We construct a system of   10
equations and estimate parameters using 3SLS. The system of equations consists of five 
components:  
(i)  Firm investment equation for private manufacturing; 
(ii)  A local wage rate equation; 
(iii) Local infrastructure supply and demand equations; 
(iv)  Two local infrastructure financing equations of municipal taxes; and  
(v)  Transfers from higher levels of government.  
The 3SLS estimators are preferred, as there is a major problem with identifying the 
effects of infrastructure using OLS. Estimates of market access and proximity to ports 
will probably be biased. As cities with good market access – and those close to 
international ports tend to be large cities – one would expect that these estimates might 
reflect unobserved benefits from agglomeration economies. At the same time, historical 
regulations on urban land acquisition for industrial use in India, coupled with 
environment regulations that have made it difficult for manufacturing to locate in large 
cities, are likely to reduce the extent to which manufacturing can locate in medium- to 
large-scale agglomerations. Our measures of national infrastructure development are 
correlated with unobserved sources of heterogeneity at the city level. We address this 
problem using instrumental variables.  
The instruments include a dummy variable for port cities (distances to ports by roads or 
rail are less than five hours), a dummy for state capitals, and various state-level 
characteristics in the year 1970. The 1970 state characteristics are: population size; 
population density; per capita total state government revenue; the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the total Net State Domestic Product (NSDP); per capita NSDP; 
the share of the number of seats won by the Congress Party, hard-left parties, and soft-
left parties; a dummy for the president’s (state) rule; a year dummy; and state dummies.
2  
The accumulation of infrastructure investments in the past will determine current 
physical infrastructure status. Time-invariant natural features, and economic and 
political conditions in the past, would have influenced infrastructure investments in the 
past and therefore be correlated with current infrastructure stocks. However, these 
natural and historical variables, by themselves, are not directly correlated with a 
manufacturing firm’s investment decisions. For example, located in a state capital city 
or a state of high NSDP in 1970 does not ‘directly’ affect a manufacturing firm’s future 
profit and its investment decision.  
In Table 3, column 1 reports the investment equation for private manufacturing. We 
find that regional and national road transport improvements raise the attractiveness of a 
city for new investment. The parameter estimates suggest that a 10 per cent reduction in 
travel time to international ports increases a city’s share of national private 
manufacturing investment by 5.3 per cent.
3 Similarly, a 10 per cent increase in the 
measure of road transport links that enhance domestic market access increases a city’s  
                                                 
2  These state-level data come from the EOPP (Economic Organization and Public Policy Programme) 
Indian State Database at London School of Economics. 
3  City’s national investment share variable is multiplied by 1000.   11
Table 3: Manufacturing firm investment and local infrastructure:  
3SLS (standard errors in parentheses) 













































































































































































































  3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS  3SLS 
ln(local infra)t  1.179**  -0.150**      
  (0.590)  (0.073)      
ln(avg. distance   -5.379***  -0.031         
to ports, hrs)1991  (1.848)  (0.190)      
ln(market    5.873***  -0.061      
access)1991  (2.216)  (0.252)      
ln(wage,  per    -5.769**       
worker, real)t  (2.285)       
ln(bus. serv. job,   -0.783  0.029         
per capita)2001  (0.583)  (0.069)      
ln(net  value-add,    0.897***      
per emp., real)t    (0.220)      
ln(local avg.       1.561    2.167***  0.445 
Income)t     (1.185)   (0.172)  (0.297) 
ln(local infra       -1.376***  0.109     
price)t     (0.188)  (0.954)    
ln(avg. cost)t      -1.023    
      (0.737)    
ln(local tax rev.,        0.683*     
per capita, real)t      (0.399)    
ln(transfers,      0.332    
per capita, real)t      (0.596)    
        
A  year  dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  155 155 155 155 155  155 
RMSE  5.705 0.639 1.219 0.706 0.344  0.596 
Notes: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
The instruments are:  
(i)  The average (real) cost of local infrastructure service provision, ln(avg. cost), which is assumed to 
be exogenously determined by technological and topographical/geographical factors; 
(ii)  A dummy for port cities (distances to ports by roads or rails are less than 5 hours); 
(iii)  A dummy for state capitals; 
(iv)  A year dummy and state dummies; and 
(v)  Various state characteristics in year 1970. The 1970 state characteristics include population size; 
population density; per capita total state government revenue; the share of manufacturing sector in 
the total NSDP; per capita NSDP; the share of the number of seats won by Congress Party, hard 
left parties, and soft left parties; a dummy for president’s (state) rule.  
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share of national private manufacturing investment by 5.8 per cent. The index of local 
infrastructure also has positive and significant effect on city investment; improving the 
local public infrastructure index by 10 per cent increases a city’s private manufacturing 
share by 1.2 per cent.  
In summary: 
(i)  Access to national infrastructure has significant effects on private manufacturing 
investment decisions; 
(ii)  Local infrastructure has a positive and significant effect; and 
(iii) Local economic conditions, such as prevailing local wage rates, influence 
location decisions. 
We find that manufacturing investment is negatively influenced by local wages, and a 
10 per cent increase in the wage rate reduces investment shares by 5.7 per cent. Quite 
surprisingly, access to business services does not have a significant effect on private 
investment decisions after controlling for physical infrastructure. 
The estimation results of the local (real) wage rate equation are in column 2. We first 
control for the net value-added per employee as a measure of labour productivity, which 
is statistically significant and positive, as expected. With regard to local factors in local 
wage determination, we observe interesting results. First, better local infrastructure 
service provision does, indeed, decrease the local wage rate. This finding is consistent 
with the cost of living compensation effect of Haughwout (2002). He proposes that, as 
local income levels and local amenities determine the welfare of local residents, firms 
can pay lower wages to local workers in the cities that provide better infrastructure 
services. Second, better access to national transport infrastructure does not have 
additional effects on local wage determination, as it is already incorporated into local 
labour productivity (net value-added per employee). 
Columns 3 to 6 are the 3SLS estimates of Equations (2) and (3) for infrastructure supply 
and demand. We also add state dummies and a year dummy to control for unobserved 
attributes. 
The coefficient estimate of the price elasticity of local infrastructure demand is 
statistically significant, with an expected negative sign. The price elasticity of local 
infrastructure supply has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant. 
This might imply that local governments provide infrastructure services on a non-
market pricing basis, emphasizing the role of governments as public good providers. 
Local infrastructure provision costs have a negative effect on supply, as expected. 
Interestingly, municipal tax receipts (per capita, real) have a statistically significant and 
positive effect on local infrastructure supply, but the effect of transfers from higher 
levels of government is not significant. Thus, improving municipal revenue sources is a 
more effective way to finance and improve the supply of city-level infrastructure 
services. Other variables – such as the income elasticity of local infrastructure demand, 
and the cost of infrastructure supply – are less significant (significant at the 20 per cent 
level) but retain expected signs.    13
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we assessed the impact on city competitiveness of infrastructure provision 
by explicitly modelling infrastructure supply, demand, and finance. For the analysis, we 
distinguished between national infrastructure investment and placement decisions from 
city-level infrastructure supply decisions in order to identify what part of a city’s 
success can be influenced by local efforts, relative to national planning decisions and 
fixed natural endowments. 
To identify the impacts of infrastructure endowments, we revisited the debate on 
infrastructure and economic performance, which came into empirical prominence in the 
early 1990s. Most papers contributing to that debate faced identification problems 
arising from omitted variables and reverse causality. We address these issues by 
developing a structural model in which local infrastructure supply and demand are 
endogenously determined, and the effects of interregional infrastructure are separated 
from unobserved city-level sources of heterogeneity. We collect a new dataset on 
private manufacturing investment by city, and take each city’s share of national 
investment over time to reflect its competitiveness.  
Our results highlight three important issues. First, we find that access to interregional 
infrastructure, measured by domestic market access and travel time to seaports, has 
considerable and significant effects in improving a city’s attractiveness for private 
investment. Our indicator of market access is based on the new economic geography 
literature, and improves on commonly used road length or density variables as these are 
fraught with measurement error and do not account for network connectivity. Second, 
the supply of local infrastructure services has a positive and significant effect on city-
level attractiveness to investment. Our measures of local infrastructure include 
municipal roads, street lighting, water supply, and drainage. These effects are robust 
across econometric specifications and estimation procedures. The effect of market 
access and proximity to ports is much greater than the effects of local infrastructure 
supply, indicating that a large part of city success is influenced by national programme 
placement decisions and a city’s natural geography. Local efforts are important, but are 
not the main determinants of city competitiveness. 
Third, local infrastructure supply is most sensitive to a city’s ability to raise its own 
revenues by means of local taxes and user fees. While simple correlations show that 
both local revenues and transfers are associated with infrastructure supply, causality can 
only be established for own-source revenues.  
In India, as in many other countries, city mayors and managers are keen to improve 
economic competitiveness. The zeal for economic success is seen across cities – large 
and small, well connected and poorly connected. And city leaders lobby state and 
federal governments to increase their share of public investment. The analysis in this 
paper shows that investments in locally provided infrastructure services improve quality 
of life for residents but may not translate into economic success for cities far from large 
domestic markets and major sea ports. And compared to transfers from higher levels of 
government, expenditures from a city’s own revenues are better reflected in service 
improvements  
The policy implication for improving local service delivery is to find mechanisms that 
would expand local revenue bases in economically depressed cities. However, this is not   14
an easy task as local tax bases in these places are not buoyant and local governments do 
not have the autonomy to change local tax rates or the administrative capacity to 
improve collection efficiency. 
In the short run, there may be need to increase the scale of transfers that are dedicated 
for service delivery (as in ring fenced operations). This is likely to stimulate benefits in 
terms of improvements in household welfare and willingness to pay for services via 
direct user charges (as households see visible improvements in service performance). In 
the medium to long run, efforts should be placed at improving local revenue capacity 
using a combination of new valuation methods and enhanced administrative capacity. If 
an area-based system is adopted, as is used now in some of the larger cities in the 
country, then a method of updating the guidance values on a regular basis is necessary 
(see Lall and Deichmann 2006 for details). This will require not only reliable values 
from the Stamp Office, and from the state Ministries of Construction, but also a set of 
procedures for updating these values. It also will require trained staff, capable of 
valuing real property, and perhaps a central valuation unit in each state should be 
considered.  
There is much to be done to implement such a system. Most local governments do not 
have a cadre of trained assessors to evaluate property values and update them regularly. 
A capital value system is even more difficult, because valuation of individual units will 
be required. In either case, a method of requiring updating of any new construction or 
major renovations, subdivisions, etc. will need to be put in place. A capital value system 
will be difficult and costly to implement, and it will be expensive. Its introduction will 
require much careful planning and will take considerable time. 
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